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subscriptions to clients. These include the Revista Jurídica de la Universidad
de Puerto Rico, our hosts for this conference, Revista Jurídica de la
Universidad Interamericana, Revista del Colegio de Abogados or the “Bar
Association” and Ley y Foro, also from the Colegio de Abogados.
For both countries that we cover and for all materials that we offer, one of our
most important responsibilities for best serving our clients is to keep abreast
of developments in the book trade, literary trends and current events in Puerto
Rico and the Dominican Republic. This includes maintaining a solid
knowledge of each country’s history, politics, literature and culture.

The Caribbean Court of Justice: A New Judicial
Experience

DÉSIRÉE P. BERNARD
The Honorable Madam Justice Desiree Bernard is the first female judge of the
Caribbean Court of Justice. She received the honor of the eighth CARICOM
Triennial Award for Women. A lawyer by profession, she began her career in 1963
when she attained a Bachelor of Laws Degree from the University of London. By
1964 she was a qualified Solicitor and practiced in the Guyana Law Courts until
1980, when she was appointed the first female judge in the High Court of the
Supreme Court of Guyana, where she had practiced since 1965.
In 1992, she was appointed the first female Justice of Appeal in the Court of
Appeal of the Supreme Court of Guyana; in 1996, the first female Chief Justice; in
2001, the first female Chancellor of the Judiciary of Guyana and the Caribbean and in
2005, the first female Judge of the Caribbean Court of Justice.
She has served as a member of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Association of
Women Judges and as Vice President of the International Federation of Women
Lawyers. Regionally - a member of the Caribbean Council of Legal Education,
President of the Organization of the Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations.
She has been at the forefront in the formation of the Caribbean Women’s
Association, the Georgetown Toastmistress Club, the Conference on the Affairs and
Status of Women in Guyana (CASWIG), Guyana Consumer’s Association and the
Guyana Association of Women Lawyers. Her nine awards, include the Medal of
Service from the Caribbean Women’s Association and the Order of Roraima of
Guyana, the second highest national award of Guyana and now, the 2005 CARICOM
Triennial Award for Women.
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Background
The inauguration of the Caribbean Court of Justice in April 2005
represented the culmination of aspirations in earlier years to establish a court
of last resort for the Caribbean Region to replace the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council (The Privy Council) which was and still is for most
Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdictions, the final court. These aspirations
were endorsed by the legal profession through the Organisation of
Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations (OCCBA) over thirty years ago,
although the idea of such a court was not an original one having been
contemplated early in the last century. The court was envisaged as a
Caribbean Court of Appeal with an appellate jurisdiction hearing appeals
from domestic appellate courts and an original jurisdiction to interpret
regional treaties.
The year 1973 saw the emergence and adoption of the Treaty
Establishing the Caribbean Community and Common Market, familiarly
known as the Treaty of Chaguaramas. 1 A report from the West Indian
Commission established in 1989 by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Heads of Government and comprising eminent persons of the Region
recommended widening of the Caribbean Community and developing a
Single Market and Economy (CSME) as well as the establishment of a
Caribbean Supreme Court with an original jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes
among Member States pertaining to the economic integration together with
an appellate jurisdiction hearing appeals from domestic appellate courts. The
acceptance of these recommendations led to the signing of the Revised Treaty
of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (The Treaty) 2 , and provision for the
establishment of a Caribbean Court of Justice (The Court). The Agreement
Establishing the Court (The Agreement) preceded the Treaty 3 and provided
for both an original and an appellate jurisdiction 4 .

1

Signed at Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago, on 4 July, 1973.
Signed at Nassau, The Bahamas, on 5 July, 2001.
3
Came into force on 14 February, 2001.
4
Article  of the Agreement.
2
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Judicial Systems of CARICOM Member States
One of the legacies of British colonialism bequeathed to its former
colonies is the judicial system based in its entirety in most instances on the
English system with the same hierarchy of courts and their nomenclature.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England was and still remains
for all, except two 5 of those former British Caribbean colonies, the court of
final resort for appeals from domestic appellate courts. Although the common
law of England became the common law of these former colonies and
essentially remains so, there are some exceptions, for example, the RomanDutch system of land ownership in Guyana, and the French Civil Code of St.
Lucia, which has resulted in a “legal mix” of common law and civil law.
Suriname’s membership of CARICOM with its civil law system
exemplifies the diversity of the Community which over time may, at some
future date include Cuba; prophetically the complexities which may arise will
test the capabilities of the Court to deal with such a diversity of legal systems.
Suriname’s Court of Justice at present remains its court of last resort.
Agreement Establishing the Court
The existence of a regional court, specifically with an appellate
jurisdiction, is nothing new for the former British colonies of the Caribbean
Region 6 . The achievement of independent status by the colonies led to the
establishment of their own appellate courts, but with retention of the Privy
Council as the final court of appeal. The Agreement Establishing the Court
which preceded the signing of the Treaty represented the conviction of the
Contracting Parties that the Court would have “a determinative role in the
further development of Caribbean jurisprudence through the judicial
process” and would be entrenched in their national constitutions; moreover,

5

Barbados and Guyana.
See the Federal Supreme Court of 1950’s, the British Caribbean Court of
Appeal of 1960’s and the present Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court with both
original and appellate jurisdictions comprising Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, British
Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines.
6
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they were well aware that “the establishment of the Court was a further step
in the deepening of the regional integration process.” 7
Appellate Jurisdiction
In this jurisdiction the Court operates as a court of last resort for those
Member States accepting it as such, and being structurally placed at the end of
the litigation process. The conceptualisers of the Court sought to fulfil two
dreams for the Caribbean Region by uniting them in one judicial system – the
long-sought need for a final appellate court to replace the Privy Council, a
respected tribunal of colonial memory, and the establishment of an
international court to ensure effective implementation of the Treaty.
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction the Court is a superior
court of record with such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on it by the
Agreement. 8 Appeals lie to the Court as of right from final decisions of the
courts of appeal of the Contracting Parties in the following cases:
(a)

(b)
(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

in civil proceedings where the matter in
dispute is of the value of not less than
$25,000E.C. or where the appeal involves
property or a right of the said value;
in proceedings for dissolution or nullity of
marriage;
in any civil or other proceedings which
involve a question as to the interpretation of
the constitution of the Contracting Party;
in proceedings relating to redress for
contravention of the provisions of the
constitution of the Contracting Party;
in proceedings relating to the exercise of a
jurisdiction conferred expressly on a superior
court under the constitution of the
Contracting Party;
such other cases as may be prescribed by any
law of the Contracting Party.

Subject to the above, an appeal also lies to the Court with special
leave of the Court in any civil or criminal matter. Apart from appeals to the
7
8

Preamble to the Agreement.
Article XXV.
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Court as of right an appeal can be brought with leave from the court of appeal
of a Contracting Party in final decisions in any civil proceedings where, in the
opinion of the court of appeal, the question involved in the appeal is one of
great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be submitted to the
Court; also, in other cases as may be prescribed by any law of the Contracting
Party.
What is more than passing strange in relation to the appellate
jurisdiction is that although the Agreement was signed by nearly all of the
Member States of the Community, only two of those States (Barbados and
Guyana) have enacted the required domestic legislation to accord access to
the Court by their nationals. Since its inauguration these two States have been
utilising the Court to its fullest. The inhibiting factor in relation to the other
States is the requirement in some constitutions for a referendum to de-link
from the English Privy Council and hesitancy in having this done or the need
for involvement of opposition political parties in enacting relevant legislation,
but which in some instances is not forthcoming at present. One can only hope
that over time these hurdles will be surmounted, and all of the Member States
will make the appellate jurisdiction accessible to their nationals.
The following sentiments expressed by Professor Francis Jacobs in the
Journal of International Economic Law published on 14 February, 2008 9 are
instructive:
“A supreme court of high calibre has been
established in the Caribbean which would be
able to take account of local values and
develop a modern Caribbean jurisprudence
in an international context. It is regrettable
that political difficulties have obstructed
acceptance of its jurisdiction and that the
outdated jurisdiction of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council survives, in
often bizarre detail, for many of those States.
All possible steps should be taken to
encourage the Caribbean States to accept the
jurisdiction of their own supreme court.”
9

Extracted from Professor Jacobs’ book, “The Sovereignty of Law: the European
Way (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2007. Professor Jacobs is Professor
of Law, King’s College, London, and former Advocate General of the European
Court of Justice.
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Original Jurisdiction
The provisions of the Agreement governing the original jurisdiction
of the Court are replicated in the Treaty in almost identical terms,
exemplifying a synergetic relationship. Because of this, reference will be
made to similar articles in both instruments when considering the relevant
provisions.
My learned colleague and friend, Hon. Mr. Justice Duke Pollard, in
his book, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: CLOSING THE CIRCLE OF
INDEPENDENCE, posited that “the Court is perceived as the institutional
centrepiece of the CSME which aspires to the creation of a single economic
space superimposed on autonomous political jurisdictions in order to
approximate in fact, if not in law, a single economy from the economies of
many Member States.”
In its original jurisdiction the Agreement, subject to the Treaty,
confers on the Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and deliver judgment on:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

disputes between Contracting Parties;
disputes between any Contracting Parties and
the Community;
referrals from national courts or tribunals of
Contracting Parties;
applications by nationals concerning the
interpretation and application of the Treaty. 10

The Court’s exclusive jurisdiction also embraces delivery of advisory
opinions concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty given
only at the request of Member States parties to a dispute or the Community. 11
Both instruments recognise the sovereignty of the dualist Member
States of the Community, and a natural consequence of this is that each
Member State could interpret and apply the Treaty as it sees fit. Of necessity,
this would lead to varied interpretations and differences of opinion. With the
establishment of the Court certainty and uniformity of interpretation of the
terms of the Treaty are guaranteed, thereby avoiding fragmentation if left to
individual domestic courts. It is beyond dispute that certainty of an important
international instrument, such as the Treaty, is a sine qua non in attracting
10
11

Article XII of the Agreement, Article 211 of the Treaty.
Article XIII of the Agreement, Article 212 of the Treaty.
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investment to the Region, and it follows that uncertainty and unpredictability
of judicial decisions on economic issues will become a disincentive to
potential investors.
As a consequence when a national court or tribunal is seised of an
issue involving interpretation or application of the Treaty, and which is
necessary to enable it to deliver judgment, that court or tribunal must refer the
question of such interpretation or application to the Court for determination; 12
this is the sole prerogative of the Court. Similar provisions are to be found in
the instruments of the European Union, and were intended as those in our
Treaty, to secure uniformity. It is expected that this provision will have a
significant impact on the work of the Court with the referral procedure being
utilised by domestic courts when faced with matters requiring interpretation
of the Treaty.
It would be a futile exercise and totally meaningless to the parties
involved if Member States, the organs and bodies of the Community as well
as the Community itself were to ignore or refuse to comply with judgments of
the Court, and for this reason both instruments provide that the Court’s
judgments must be complied with promptly by Member States and entities of
the Community as well as any persons to whom a judgment applies. 13
The original jurisdiction of the Court is recognised as being
compulsory, ipso facto, and without special agreement 14 , an important
provision if the Court is to execute its functions effectively.
Being essential for the successful operation of the CSME whose birth
reflected a “commitment to deepen regional economic integration in order to
achieve sustained economic development based on international
competitiveness”, with objectives similar to the European Union, the Court as
an international court is empowered under both instruments to apply such
rules of international law as may be applicable, and may not decline to make a
finding on the ground of obscurity of the law. However, these provisions will
not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if
the parties so agree. 15

12

Article XIV of the Agreement, Article 214 of the Treaty.
Article XV of the Agreement, Article 215 of the Treaty.
14
Article XVI of the Agreement, Article 216 of the Treaty.
15
Article XVII of the Agreement; Article 217 of the Treaty.
13
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Much reliance will be placed and assistance gleaned from
international tribunals such as the European Court of Justice and the Court of
Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa which are
courts established with a similar function to interpret and apply the relevant
instruments.
After proceedings are instituted before the Court either between
Member States or between a national and another Member State, a third party
may wish to intervene to protect an interest. In this regard the Agreement
permits intervention if the intended intervener, whether Member State, the
Community or a person, establishes that it has a substantial interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by a decision of the Court. 16
If circumstances arise after a judgment of the Court has been handed
down and which may adversely affect the parties, a request for the judgment
to be revised can be made. Such a request may be considered by the Court if
an application is made within six months of the discovery of a fact which was
not known at the date of the judgment and which may have been a decisive
factor provided such an application is made not more than five years from the
date of judgment. 17
Queries have often been raised about the Court’s powers in enforcing
its judgments. Enforcement of judgments of domestic courts is usually
provided for by legislation of the particular state. In like manner Contracting
Parties (Member States) agree to take all necessary steps, including the
enactment of legislation, to ensure that all authorities in the State act in aid of
the Court, and that any judgment or order of the Court be enforced by all
courts and authorities of a Contracting Party in the same way as any judgment
or order of a superior domestic court of that State. 18 This provision applies to
both jurisdictions of the Court as does Article III of the Agreement which
provides that the decisions of the Court shall be final.
The perception of the average Caribbean citizen is that the Treaty
came into being mainly for the regulation of trade and maintaining a sound
economic environment for Member States, and only incidentally for the
benefit of individuals. Nothing could be further from the truth. There are
several provisions in the Treaty which have a direct bearing on the every day
life of persons in the Caribbean Region, for example, the movement of skilled
16

Article XVIII; there is no similar provision in the Treaty.
Article XX of the Agreement, Article 219 of the Treaty.
18
Article XXVI of the Agreement.
17
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persons and of nationals without harassment, as well as the elimination of the
requirement for passports, to name a few 19 . This is an important aspect of the
Court’s jurisdiction and provision is made for hearing and determining
disputes involving persons or legal entities (such as companies) of a
Contracting Party concerning interpretation or application of the Treaty. 20 It
can only be invoked with special leave of the Court if it determines that the
Treaty intended that a right or benefit conferred on a Contracting Party was to
enure to the benefit of the persons or entities directly. In its application to the
Court the persons or entities have to establish that they have been prejudiced
in respect of the enjoyment of the right or benefit, and that the Contracting
Party who is entitled to espouse the claim has omitted or declined to do so or
has expressly agreed to the persons or entities doing so in its stead. The Court
ultimately has to find that the interest of justice requires that the persons or
entities be allowed to espouse the claim. The Court in its first case in the
original jurisdiction is at present in the process of determining issues in
relation to this provision of the Treaty in proceedings between two companies
and a Member State.
In any court binding judicial precedent is desirable (the doctrine of
stare decisis) if stability and predictability are to be maintained particularly in
a court entrusted with the jurisdiction of interpretation of a treaty essential for
the successful operation of a single market and economy aimed at attracting
investment. Both the Agreement and the Treaty provide that judgments of the
Court shall be legally binding precedents for parties in proceedings before it 21
taking into account revision of a judgment. It is acceptable that judgments of
the Court should be legally binding precedents for parties involved in
proceedings before the Court; what is yet to be decided by the Court is
whether it will consider itself bound by its own decisions. The Privy Council
has never regarded itself bound by its own decisions which sometimes have
led to inconsistency and unpredictability particularly when the liberty of
persons is involved. It is too early to forecast what course the Court will take
having been in existence for a relatively short period of time with appeals in
its appellate jurisdiction coming from only two Member States, and only now
beginning to hear matters in its original jurisdiction.
One of the concerns of the Community reflected in the Treaty was
that “the benefits expected from the establishment of the CSME were not

19

Article 46.
Article XXIV of the Agreement, Article 222 of the Treaty.
21
Article XXII of the Agreement; Article 221 of the Treaty.
20
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frustrated by anti-competitive business conduct”. 22 To avoid and monitor such
practices provision is made for the establishment of a regional competition
commission to be appointed by the Regional Judicial and Legal Services
Commission 23 (functions of which will be discussed later). In carrying out its
duties the Competition Commission may seek the Court’s intervention when
necessary, and any party aggrieved by a determination of the Commission
may apply to the Court for a review of that determination. 24
Anti-competitive business conduct may be prohibited by a Member
State, and examples of such conduct are enumerated in the Treaty, 25 such as
the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or the artificial
dividing up of markets or restriction of supply sources. Of course, the list is
not exhaustive, and where a Member State is uncertain whether a particular
business conduct is prohibited under the Treaty, the State may apply to the
Commission for a ruling on the matter. The Court’s jurisdiction may also be
invoked by the Commission to review its own decision if it is found or felt
that such a decision was induced by deceit or improper means. 26
Notwithstanding the compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction accorded
to the Court to hear and determine disputes between Member States
concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty, elaborate
provisions are stipulated in the Treaty for the settlement of disputes without
recourse to the Court 27 , for example, where allegations arise that an actual or
proposed measure of a Member State is or would be inconsistent with the
objectives of the Community or there are allegations that the purpose or
object of the Treaty is being frustrated or prejudiced. A perusal of the
relevant articles of the Treaty suggests that every effort should be made and
all procedures exhausted in settling disputes between Member States and
between organs and bodies of the Community before the jurisdiction of the
Court is invoked in contentious proceedings. Alternative disputes settlements
are to be encouraged by Member States to the maximum extent possible in
relation to private commercial disputes among Community nationals as well
as among Community nationals and nationals of third States. 28 The
Agreement also enjoins Contracting Parties to do the same. 29 This being so,
22

Preamble to the Treaty.
Article 172.
24
Article 175.
25
Article 171.
26
Article 180.
27
Articles 187 – 210.
28
Article 223.
29
Article XXIII.
23
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proceedings instituted by private persons and entities may be the vehicle to
drive the Court forward in making an impact as “the institutional centrepiece
of the CSME.”
Judgments of the Court
Since its inauguration in April 2005, and until very recently the
Court’s judgments have been handed down exclusively in its appellate
jurisdiction in mainly civil matters with a few criminal and family law
appeals. To date over forty (40) matters have been filed in the Court, with
only two in the original jurisdiction. Within the appellate jurisdiction several
applications for special leave to appeal as a poor person were granted. These
applications vindicate the establishment of the Court as providing access to
justice to those who cannot afford the expense of legal representation to the
Privy Council located thousands of miles away from the Region; similarly the
frequent use of audio-conferencing which further reduces travelling costs to
litigants. Following are a few of the Court’s judgments.
The landmark judgment of the Court in Attorney General of Barbados
v Joseph & Boyce defined the Court’s jurisprudence on the effect of an
unincorporated human rights treaty ratified by the Executive on the
international plane and sought to be enforced on the domestic plane in death
penalty cases. 30 Several other issues fell to be determined with judgments
written by all of the judges of the Court. This case was the first major test of
the Court on the deeply-sensitive issue of the death penalty particularly as it
was perceived within the Caribbean Region and predicted to be a “hanging
court,” based on the false assumption that the judges would comply with the
wishes of the political directorate who in some instances had been dissatisfied
with judgments of the Privy Council allowing appeals of persons convicted of
murder.
Following is a short summary of the facts of the case. Two men were
convicted of the offence of murder by the courts in Barbados, and exhausted
all of their remedies up to the Privy Council. Death warrants were read to
them by decision of the local Privy Council (a committee on the prerogative
of mercy) while awaiting hearing of their petitions to the Inter American
Commission on Human Rights based on Barbados’ ratification of the Inter
American Convention on Human Rights which had not been incorporated into
the domestic law by legislation. The condemned men sought unsuccessfully to
postpone their executions by instituting proceedings in the High Court, and
30

(2006) 69 WIR 106.
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later appealed to the local Court of Appeal which commuted their sentences to
life imprisonment. The Attorney General appealed to the Caribbean Court of
Justice.
As mentioned earlier several other issues arose which time does not
permit to mention, but with regard to the effect of unincorporated
international treaties on a condemned person’s right to the protection of the
law, the Court held that the respondents had a legitimate expectation that they
would be allowed a reasonable time within which to complete the process
initiated by petitioning the Inter American Commission on Human Rights,
and for the State to attempt to execute them before that process was
completed was a denial of their right to the protection of the law. Legitimate
expectation, simpliciter, was expressed to be procedural and vulnerable to
frustration by a change of official conduct according to one of the judges who
posited that international acts by the Executive must be accompanied by
“treaty-compliant” conduct on the municipal plane in dualist jurisdictions in
order to engender such an expectation to which municipal courts may accord
protection. The conduct in this case regarded as being compliant with the
treaty was the Barbados Government’s stated position that it was its practice
to permit condemned persons an opportunity to have petitions to international
human rights bodies processed before execution of their sentences in keeping
with its commitment to honour its international obligations. This was the main
factor giving rise to a legitimate expectation, and one queries whether, absent
such conduct, an unincorporated treaty ratified by the Executive on the
international plane can provide an effective remedy for a national on the
domestic plane.
What makes this issue in the judgment interesting is the judgment of
one of the judges from a civil law jurisdiction with its monist approach to the
incorporation of international treaties into domestic law. He opined that the
strongest concept underlying the doctrine of unenforceability of ratified
treaties was the separation of powers, and expressed the view that although
this may be sufficient reason for the existence of the doctrine in the unwritten
English Constitution it was unsuitable for the Commonwealth Caribbean with
written Constitutions. An in-depth analysis of the judgments is recommended
to appreciate the advantages of diversity of opinion in the Court’s quest to
create a Caribbean jurisprudence.
Another appeal of interest is the case of The Queen v Mitchell Ken
O’Neal Lewis 31 concerned primarily with issues of procedure under Section
31

(2007) 79 WIR, 75.
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6(c) of the Caribbean Court of Justice Act of Barbados. The Section provides
for an appeal to lie to the Court from decisions of the court of appeal as of
right in any civil or criminal proceedings which involve a question as to the
interpretation of the Constitution. The preliminary issue which fell to be
determined was whether the Crown can appeal as of right to the Court by
virtue of Section 6(c). This arose in circumstances where an accused was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On appeal to the court of appeal
the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered on the ground that
prejudicial material had been introduced in the presence of the jury and this
rendered the trial unfair. The Crown through the Director of Public
Prosecutions submitted that the court of appeal’s conclusion was based on an
erroneous interpretation of the “fair hearing” provision in the Constitution of
Barbados which is the usual provision found in all constitutions based on the
Westminster model – a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial court, and for this reason the Crown had an appeal
as of right to the Court.
All of the judges of the Court agreed that the right of appeal created
by Section 6(c) of the Caribbean Court of Justice Act of Barbados is available
to the Crown provided that the case involves a question concerning the
interpretation of the Constitution, and the question whether in this case the
accused received a fair hearing was a question not of interpretation of the
relevant section of the Constitution, but of the application of it to the facts,
and accordingly the Crown was not entitled in this case to appeal as of right to
the Court. The appeal was dismissed, but the order for a retrial was left intact.
One of the judges delivered a judgment on the susceptibility of the
term “fair hearing” to judicial interpretation, which has the effect of
enhancing the rich pool of judicial opinions available from the Court.
The whole concept of adverse possession of immovable property was
discussed in the recent Guyanese appeal of Toolsie Persaud Ltd v Andrew
James Investments Ltd and Others 32 which concerned certain lands originally
owned by two of the respondents, but compulsorily acquired by the
Government of Guyana and later sold to the appellant who went into
possession under the agreement of sale. Several years later upon a
constitutional motion filed in court by the first respondent the compulsory
acquisition orders were declared null and void. The appellant company while
still in possession of the lands later applied to the court for prescriptive title.
Three issues arose for consideration – (a) did the State have the necessary
32

CCJ Appeal No. CV 1 of 2007.
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intention for its possession to be adverse when that possession was based on
the belief that it was the owner under a compulsory acquisition order
subsequently declared to be invalid, (b) was it possible for the State to acquire
land by adverse possession, and (c) did a landowner’s right of action to
recover land acquired from him by the State under an invalid compulsory
acquisition order only arise when the order was declared to be invalid by a
court upon a constitutional motion brought by the landowner?
In relation to (a) the Court held that physical occupation and use of
land with the intention and effect of excluding everyone else, amounts to
adverse possession, whether the occupier acts in good faith believing himself
to be the owner, or in bad faith knowing that someone else is the owner. With
regard to (b) the Court held that a landowner’s constitutional right to prevent
the State from positively taking his land from him against his will, was
completely consistent with a landowner losing his title if for twelve years he
failed to take any action against someone who was occupying his land and
excluding him from it. In answer to (c) the Court held that a landowner’s
right of action to recover his land arises as soon as he can bring an action in
which he can claim recovery of title and possession; thereafter time runs
against him. Passing of possession from the State to the appellant was
seamless, and possession pursuant to a contractual right could be added to the
State’s earlier adverse possession.
As mentioned earlier in this presentation Guyana’s law of immovable
property is based in large measure on the Roman-Dutch system of land
ownership, and this arose for consideration in a recent appeal from the Court
of Appeal of Guyana in the case of Harrinauth Ramdass v Salim Jairam and
Others 33 which originated from an agreement of sale of land between the
appellant and his sister, who was deceased at the date of hearing of an action
brought by the appellant against her. After the appellant entered into
possession of the land in accordance with the agreement, the sister sold and
passed title for a portion of land to another purchaser at a higher price. The
appellant filed proceedings against the vendor and the new purchaser for
specific performance of the agreement and revocation of the title of the
purchaser.
The appellant alleged in his pleadings that the vendor and the
purchaser had conspired to defraud him of the property, but gave no
particulars of the alleged fraud and the allegation was later withdrawn.
However, he sought to persuade the court that he acquired an equitable
33

CCJ Appeal No. CV 3 of 2006.
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interest in the land. The trial judge held that equitable interests in immovable
property are not recognized in Guyana, and refused the order for specific
performance as well as the claim for the revocation of the purchaser’s title.
An appeal to the Court of Appeal of Guyana was dismissed. In an
appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice the main issue concerned the ongoing
debate of whether equitable interests in land in Guyana are recognized or can
be acquired having regard to the development of the law of immovable
property in Guyana inherited from the Roman Dutch system, particularly in
relation to a purchaser who is put in possession under an agreement of sale.
The majority view reflected in Guyanese cases and the independent analysis
of the Court indicate an acceptance of the conclusion that equitable interests
in land are not recognized in Guyana although statutory provisions permit the
application of equitable remedies. Accordingly the appellant acquired no
equitable interest in the land purchased from his sister. He, however, was
entitled to seek from her an order for specific performance of the agreement
of sale which in fact he sought, but only after she had passed title to the other
purchaser who acquired an indefeasible title subject only to a possibility of it
being declared void for fraud which was abandoned at the hearing of the
action in the lower court.
In relation to the grant of leave to appeal as a poor person the case of
Elizabeth Ross v Coreen Sinclair 34 exemplifies the Court’s efforts to afford
access to justice by all. Leave to appeal as a poor person had been refused by
the Court of Appeal of Guyana, and the applicant was ordered to lodge
security for costs in the sum of $100,000G within ninety (90) days failing
which the appeal would stand dismissed. She sought leave from the CCJ to
appeal as a poor person being blind and virtually penniless. The case
involved ownership of a condominium in which she had resided for several
years as a tenant of a deceased resident, but owned by a housing authority.
The administratrix of the deceased resident, the respondent, was in no better
financial position. The appeal involved issues about the rightful owner of the
condominium, and which the Court considered had reasonable prospects of
success.
However, the main issue centred around the procedural point of
whether the Court could grant leave to appeal as a poor person when such
leave had been refused by the Court of Appeal which under the Appellate
Jurisdiction Rules of the CCJ was the court empowered to grant such leave;
this would have the effect of reversing the decision of the court below and the
34
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appearance of the Court sitting as a court of review. The Rules make no
provision for this. After hearing arguments both written and oral from
Counsel for the parties who appeared pro bono, the Court granted leave to the
applicant to appeal as a poor person by utilising Rule 1.3 of the CCJ Rules
which defines the overriding objective as being “to enable the Court to deal
with cases fairly and expeditiously so as to ensure a just result.” The
reasoning was that the fact that the Rules conferred on the court of appeal the
power to grant leave to appeal as a poor person, does not mean that a refusal
of such leave disables the Court, if it considers that the interest of justice so
requires, from making an order of its own granting such leave, particularly if
the appeal is considered to have merit. 35
As stated earlier two cases have been filed recently in the original
jurisdiction, and are in the process of hearing. It is hoped that now that the
ice has been broken there will be a steady flow particularly from natural and
juridical persons within the Region.
Administration
(a) Appointment of Judges
The unique feature of the Court is not confined only to its peculiar
dual jurisdiction. Being an international court with jurisdiction to apply and
interpret a Treaty subscribed to by Member States of an economic union, one
would expect that appointment of the judges of the Court would be influenced
by the Member States who may field candidates for appointment either in an
individual capacity or as representing a State. This form of judicial
appointment to international courts and tribunals is frequently the norm, for
example, appointments to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on which
member states of the European Union are represented, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), and other international tribunals appointments to which are
made by the United Nations states parties. In contrast the judges of the
Caribbean Court are appointed by a Regional Judicial and Legal Services
Commission (RJLSC) 36 comprising representatives of regional bar
associations, civil society and academic institutions, totally independent of
political influence and of which the President of the Court is the Chairman.
The establishment of this Commission sought to allay deep-seated fears (real
or perceived) within the Caribbean Region about political interference in the
35
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judgments of the Court due to some alleged unfortunate instances of
perceived interference within the domestic courts of the Region.
In a recent work titled THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE, the authors 37
expressed the view that “in general one cannot apply to become an
international judge,” 38 and that “national governments have total control over
who will be put forward for an international judicial position and who will
not.” 39 To avoid such a situation the appointment procedure for the Court
involved advertisements in the media and online, which attracted applications
both from the Caribbean Region and the international community. Interviews
followed and short lists compiled from which the final six judges were
selected with no consideration being given to equitable geographical
distribution; judges were chosen solely for their individual expertise.
Incidentally two of the judges appointed do not belong to any CARICOM
Member State. The Agreement provides for the composition of the Court to
be the President and nine other judges. 40
The judges of the Court are chosen and appointed solely by the
Commission. The Agreement provides for the appointment of the President
to be made by the qualified majority vote of three-quarters of the Contracting
Parties. 41 However, this can only be done on an affirmative recommendation
of the Commission.
Criteria for appointment as a judge of the Court laid down in the
Agreement include judicial experience for a period of not less than five years
in a common law or civil law jurisdiction or engagement in the practice or
teaching of law for a period of not less than fifteen years. Regard will also be
had to high moral character, intellectual and analytical ability, sound
judgment, integrity and understanding of people and society. 42 With such
criteria the judges of Court will be assessed ultimately by the quality of the
judgments emanating from the Court.
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(b) Tenure of Office of the Judges
The majority of judges serving on international courts do so for
specified term limits, seven or nine years, and because they are elected they
can be re-elected for a further specified term. In relation to the Court the
Agreement provides for length of tenure tied to the attainment of a fixed age
of retirement rather than a term limit. The Agreement stipulates a retirement
age of seventy-two years 43 with a discretion recently given to the RJLSC to
grant an extension of an additional three years upon request and if the services
of the judge are deemed necessary for the work of the Court. The President is
mandated to serve as President for a non-renewable term of seven years.
Concerns have surfaced that the judges of the Court do not enjoy the
same security of tenure as judges of domestic courts whose appointments are
entrenched in the domestic constitutions of Member States; in fact this issue
was litigated in the Jamaican courts all the way to the Privy Council 44 which
held that the judges of the Court did not enjoy the same security of tenure
under the Constitution as the judges of the higher Jamaican domestic court,
and deemed the legislation which sought to implement the Court to be
unconstitutional. To ensure security of tenure of the judges of the Court
Member States must honour not only the undertaking enshrined in the Treaty
to employ their best endeavours in completing the constitutional and
legislative procedures required for their participation in establishing the
Court, 45 but also the desirability of entrenching the Court in their national
constitutions in accordance with the Preamble to the Agreement; to this one
may add entrenchment on the same terms as the judges of their domestic
courts.
With regard to removal of a judge from office, this can only be
achieved by inability to perform the functions of the office, whether due to
illness or for misbehaviour, with a procedure for such removal being invoked
by the RJLSC. 46 Accountability of the holders of judicial office is essential in
inspiring public confidence, and in this regard self-regulation of judicial
conduct must be a priority. To ensure this a code of judicial conduct has been
formulated.
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(c) Financial Provisions
One incidence of judicial independence is that the judiciary
considered to be the third branch of a State, must be provided with sufficient
and sustainable funding by the other two branches – the Executive and the
Legislature – for the performance of its functions to the highest standards.
This is one of the Guidelines for preserving judicial independence reflected
in the COMMONWEALTH PRINCIPLES ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. 47 In this
regard the expenses associated with the Court including maintenance of the
seat of the Court (based in Trinidad and Tobago) under the Agreement are to
be borne by the Contracting Parties. 48
Based on past experiences of States’ tardiness in honouring regional
financial commitments and in order to guarantee the Court some measure of
financial autonomy from regional governments, a Trust Fund was created by
the Member States with capital of US$100 million which was raised through
international financial markets by the Caribbean Development Bank. The
said sum was transferred to a Board of Trustees of reputable persons with the
requisite skills who are responsible for its management and disbursement to
the administrators of the Court for its management. It was lent to the Member
States at low rates of interest and repayable over a period of fifteen to twenty
years.
This arrangement for financing an international court has been
commended by experts knowledgeable about the operations of international
courts. It is certainly a novel arrangement, and again another feature of the
Court’s uniqueness.
Potential Issues for the Court’s Determination
With the birth of the CSME in 2001 the Court in its original
jurisdiction was regarded as being essential for its successful operation. To
date only the “Single Market” aspect has been implemented with the
“Economy” being deferred to some opportune future date. In the present
dispensation Member States resolve “to establish conditions to facilitate
access by their nationals to the collective resources of the Region on a non-
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discriminatory basis,” 49 and which is reflected in the Treaty. 50 It provides that
“within the scope of application of the Treaty and without prejudice to any
special provisions . . ., any discrimination on grounds of nationality only
shall be prohibited.” 51
I posit that this Article of the Treaty is fundamental to the success of
the Single Market involving as it does persons (natural and juridical) of the
Region. It is the people of the Region from the collective Member States who
will ensure success; divisiveness will ensure failure. In this regard the Court’s
role will be pivotal in resolving issues that will inevitably arise among
nationals of one Member State residing or employed in another Member State
amid allegations of perceived discrimination. Being cognisant of the tendency
of nationals of one Member State to view those born in another Member State
as foreigners, it is expected that allegations of discriminatory treatment will
lead to recourse to the Court for an interpretation of the Treaty.
Another aspect of the Treaty with which the Court will have to
grapple is the prohibition of new restrictions by Member States relating to
the right of establishment of nationals of other Member States except as
otherwise provided in the Treaty. 52 The right of establishment within the
meaning of that part of the Treaty includes the right to engage in any nonwage-earning activities of a commercial, industrial, agricultural, professional
or artisanal nature, or to create and manage economic enterprises which
include any type of organisation for the production of or trade in goods or the
provision of services. Again, because of the same perceptions of nationals of
one Member State against others, the Court will play a decisive role in
determining issues concerning the right of establishment.
Laudably, Member States undertake to “take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the carrying out of
obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by the
Organs and Bodies of the Community,” and to “facilitate the objectives of the
Community” as well as “abstain from any measures which could jeopardise
the attainment of the Treaty.” 53 The question arises – will the Court ever be
called upon to interpret or apply this important provision of the Treaty?
Maybe, the answer lies in the hands of the peoples of the Caribbean Region.
49
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